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In Defense of Market Self-Regulation  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF FUTURES 
REGULATION AND THE TREND TOWARD 
DEMUTUALIZATION* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate over the efficacy of the U.S. system of 
market self-regulation—where the securities and futures 
industries regulate themselves with oversight from the federal 
government—has been ongoing since its inception some 
seventy years ago.1 Populist politicians have long compared the 
system, primarily in times of regulatory failures or market 
crises, to the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. The 
controversy surrounding recent market scandals has led to new 
scrutiny of whether exchanges can properly police themselves.2 
  
 * © 2005 Jake Keaveny. All Rights Reserved. 
 1 In 1963 the efficacy of the self-regulatory system was called into question 
by stock market abuses reported in a Securities and Exchange Commission study, but 
the SEC concluded that self-regulation should be maintained. Roberta S. Karmel, 
Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and 
Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 401 (2002) (citing SEC, REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, at 502, 83, 414-15 (1st Sess. 
1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY]); see generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION (1987) [hereinafter HISTORY OF 
COMMODITY FUTURES] (illustrating periodic strife between Congress and futures 
industry since late 1800s regarding self-regulation). Between 1880 and 1920 there were 
some 200 bills introduced in Congress to regulate futures and options trading. Id. at 
10. 
1419 
 2 See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: 
Can Wall Street Regulate Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107282097396518500,00.html (while the 
current system of self-regulation with government oversight has survived numerous 
crisis, the scandal surrounding a $188 million pay package awarded to former New 
York Stock Exchange Chairman Richard Grasso has forced Wall Street to confront 
whether the system must be “drastically reformed or even replaced” in order to restore 
the confidence of investors). Some suggest that a for-profit exchange will not vigorously 
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The catalyzing events include a price-fixing investigation at the 
Nasdaq in the late 1990s, an ongoing investigation of floor 
trading at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),3 and 
governance failures at the NYSE that resulted in the ousting of 
former chairman Richard Grasso.4 Some have called for reforms 
to overhaul the system, while others say it should be scrapped 
altogether.5  
The current debate over self-regulation was actually 
well under way before these regulatory failures pushed it onto 
the business pages. Industry and government officials have 
been actively debating how self-regulation can be adapted to 
address new conflicts of interest caused by a much more 
secular change: the ongoing trend of demutualization, where 
securities and futures exchanges convert to for-profit entities 
from not-for-profits.6 The latest example is the NYSE’s 
announced plan to demutualize as it acquires electronic trading 
system Archipelago Holdings.7  
This Note argues that the self-regulatory model, while 
in need of some type of reform, will survive the latest round of 
scrutiny because time has shown that it is the most efficient 
and practical alternative. The debate over self-regulation must 
be made in the context of the alternatives: the government as 
the sole securities regulator or no government oversight at all.8 
It is important to remember that direct governmental 
regulation raises some of the same concerns that self-
regulation does, as well as different concerns that are 
particular to large government bureaucracies.9 The principal 
  
undertake self-regulatory obligations if those obligations negatively affect profitability. 
THOMAS ERICKSON, FUTURES EXCHANGE DEMUTUALIZATION 5 (2000) (internal 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) report by former CFTC 
Commissioner Erickson) (on file at CFTC).  
 3 See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Big Changes at Exchanges Bring Their Self-
Regulation Into Question, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2005 (At issue is whether self-
regulation works . . . virtually every regional exchange has been cited for turning a 
blind eye to improper or illegal behavior of one sort or another.)  
 4 Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. ASSOC., REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION, WHITE 
PAPER FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 8-9 (2000, updated 2003), available 
at http://www.sia.com/testimony/html/white_paper1.html [hereinafter WHITE PAPER] 
(outlining the advantages and disadvantages of the current regulatory regime as part 
of a study into whether an alternative model should be employed).  
 7 See, e.g., Andre Postelnicu et al., NYSE to Merge with Archipelago 
Exchange, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005.  
 8 See, e.g., Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A 
Critical Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 861 (1985). 
 9 See, e.g., Raymond Urban & Richard Menckel, Federal Regulation of 
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advantages for self-regulation as an adjunct to government 
oversight are to minimize intrusion into the marketplace, take 
advantage of the expertise of professionals working within the 
exchanges, and defray the costs of monitoring and policing 
trading practices to the private sector.10  
The self-regulatory model has been in continuous 
evolution since it was created under the Commodity Exchange 
Act in 1936, first operating under the oversight of the 
Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA), and later the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission.11 In the case of the 
securities industry, modern self-regulation began under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, when the Securities and 
Exchange Commission was created. For decades the 
government sought to increase its authority over exchanges, 
focusing on rooting out fraud and bolstering the financial 
strength of market participants.12 With regards to the futures 
industry, in recent years the government has changed tacks by 
relaxing the regulatory framework and giving self-regulatory 
organizations more authority, not less, as a means to improve 
efficiency.13  
  
Whiskey Labeling: From the Repeal of Prohibition to the Present, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 
411 (1972); William A. Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the 
Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. L. & ECON. 151 (1972), as cited in Miller, supra 
note 8, at 861. Miller argues that in some cases no regulation at all (other than that 
provided by privately enforced rights) might be a preferable alternative. Id. New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer said that the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
become too close with the securities industry, as evidenced by its early rejection of 
efforts to force Wall Street banks to reform the way they provide stock research. 
Interview by Reuters News with Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General, New 
York, NY (Nov. 12, 2003). Spitzer went on to say that the SEC is slow to uncover 
abuses, is too soft on violators, and is too slow in crafting new rules that address 
abuses. Id. Throughout history, no single government authority has ever been 
entrusted with regulatory authority over all American banks. See Jerry W. Markham, 
Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 405 
n.435 (2003) (citing BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON 
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 8 (1984)). 
 10 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6. 
 11 See generally HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1.   
 12 Id.  
 13 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General 
Legislature, Subcomm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 107th Cong. 2 (2000) 
(statement by C. Robert Paul, General Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, detailing the content and purpose of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000, at the time it was being proposed to Congress).  
[T]he proposed RFE [(Recognized Futures Exchange)] offers significant 
regulatory relief compared to the current requirements applicable to 
designated contract markets. . . . The second category, the derivatives 
transaction facility [DTF], would be subject to a lesser degree of Commission 
oversight. . . . Finally, the third category, the exempt multilateral transaction 
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It is natural that self-regulatory bodies be forced to 
undergo further reforms as new governance concerns arise. A 
current concern is the creation of new potential conflicts of 
interest that stem from the transformation into for-profit 
entities.14 But this paper also argues that the underlying forces 
fueling the move to demutualize—for instance, the advent of 
electronic exchanges, internationalization of markets and 
increased competition both domestically and abroad—will 
create new incentives for exchanges to better police themselves 
by increasing more competition among exchanges.  
This analysis will begin by looking at the historic 
evolution of self-regulation in the U.S. futures industry,15 
including how power has shifted back and forth between the 
federal government and the exchanges. The Note then reviews 
how different exchanges have reacted to recent allegations of 
conflicts of interest and failures in corporate governance, and 
finally, it reviews the most widely considered options being 
proposed to change the system.16 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-REGULATION  
A.  Prior to the Commodities Exchange Act of 1936 
Organized futures trading dates back to the founding of 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848, where 
  
execution facility [MTEF], or exempt MTEF, would operate on an 
unregulated basis.  
Id. at 3. 
 14 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 1. 
 15 The regulatory regimes of both futures and securities exchanges are 
similar. This Note addresses issues relevant to both, though unless otherwise noted, it 
will focus on futures exchanges. The regulation of futures trading is less politicized 
than that of securities—at least by some measures—because futures and other 
derivatives contracts are mainly traded by large financial institutions and other 
sophisticated investors. By contrast, the shares in publicly held companies traded on 
securities exchange are to a large degree held, both directly and indirectly, by retail 
investors and pensioners. As a result, the tendency of elected officials to pressure for 
stricter regulation in the securities industry is more tightly linked to the ups and 
downs of the market than it is for the futures industry (though regulation of the 
futures is certainly not immune from political lobbying by market participants). See 
generally Markham, supra note 9, at 399-403 (describing the hysteria within Congress 
and by various regulatory offices to quickly react to scandals surrounding publicly 
traded companies like energy trader Enron Corp. and investment bank Merrill Lynch 
& Co.) 
 16 Demutualization is the process of reorganizing a mutualized, or member 
owned, entity into a for-profit corporation with shareholders. Organized securities and 
futures exchanges where traditionally operated as non-profit membership 
organizations, but advances in technology, increased competition and other market 
forces have led numerous exchanges to demutualize. Karmel, supra note 1, at 368-69.  
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commodities ranging from grain to coal to alcohol were traded.17 
At the outset, U.S. futures exchanges regulated themselves, 
with some oversight from state regulators, though none from 
the federal government.18 The main incentive for self-regulation 
was to assure high standards of conduct and decorum on the 
trading floor.19 It became clear early on that a more rigid form 
of government oversight would be needed.20  
As trading volumes on futures exchanges grew during 
the late 19th century, there developed a steady flow of 
allegations that the market was vulnerable to manipulation.21 
The failures of the system became apparent in the 1880s with 
the rise of so-called bucket shops, which were poorly financed, 
off-exchange establishments where speculators bet on 
commodities prices.22 Many banks would not lend money to 
brokerages that were not members of the most prominent 
exchanges, so smaller brokerages would often “bucket” their 
clients’ money in order to get capital with which to trade.23 By 
1891, the practice had become so prevalent that one member of 
the CBOT, one of the most respected commodities exchanges, 
wrote a pamphlet actually defending bucket shops.24 The 
Consolidated Exchange, a securities exchange which at the 
time was a powerful rival to the New York Stock Exchange, 
  
 17 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 4.  
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. (citing JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 1859-
1905, at 25 (1979)). 
 20 See id. at 10.  
 21 Id. at 4. 
 22 THOMAS HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 88 (1971). 
 23 ROBERT SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
STOCK EXCHANGE 69 (1970).  
 24 H. S. Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155, 155 
n.5 (1938). Bucket shops accepted customers’ orders and funds but did not execute the 
orders on any exchange. Rather, they simply bet the customer would lose and kept the 
customer’s money when they did. If the customer won too much, the bucket shop would 
simply fold its operations and move to a new location. Comparative Analysis, supra 
note 15, at 339 n.92 (citing JOHN HILL, JR., GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION 37-39 
(1904)). 
The term “bucketshop” as now applied in the United States, was first used in 
the late [18]70’s, but it is very evident that it was coined in London as many 
as 50 years ago, when it had absolutely no reference to any species of 
speculation or gambling. It appears that beer swillers from the East Side 
(London) went from street to street with a bucket, draining every keg they 
came across and picking up cast off cigar butts. Arriving at a den, they 
gathered for social amusement around a table and passed the bucket as a 
loving cup . . . the den soon became called a bucket shop. Later on the term 
was applied, both in England and the United States, as a byword for 
reproach, to small places where grain and stock deals were counterfeited. 
Id. 
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came to be regarded as a “den of bucketeers.” The Chicago 
Open Board of Trade, or the “Little Board,” was said to be 
captured by bucketeers (The Chicago Open Board of Trade 
later became the Mid-America Commodity Exchange, which 
eventually joined with the CBOT in 1985).25  
As the bucket shops became more influential, the 
exchanges found themselves in a conflicted position with state 
regulators. Those that were losing business began to push for 
more assistance from state regulators, but at the same time, 
the exchanges tried to defend their right to regulate themselves 
against mounting criticism that futures trading had become 
corrupted. Some of the more prominent exchanges tried to put 
the bucket shops out of business by cutting off access to market 
quotations.26 In a major victory, the CBOT established the legal 
right to prevent bucket shops from obtaining market 
quotations in the 1904 case, Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie 
Grain & Stock Co.27 The CBOT used undercover detectives and 
eventually prosecuted a number of its members for engaging in 
bucket shop activities.28 Expulsions resulted, with 281 people in 
Illinois indicted for violating the state’s anti-bucket shop laws.29  
Political pressures to create federal oversight of the 
exchanges mounted, but the industry still had some powerful 
supporters. President Herbert Hoover was quoted as saying 
that the CBOT is “the most economical and efficient agency of 
the marketing of foodstuffs anywhere in the world.”30 Other 
politicians stated that it would be a mistake to supplant a 
system that is dictated by the market with an inefficient 
government bureaucracy.31 
  
 25 M. Van Smith, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the 
Return of the Bucketeers: A Lesson in Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D. L. REV. 7, 13 (1981).  
 26 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 9. 
 27 Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 253 
(1905) (upholding an injunction which cut off quotations to the operations of C.C. 
Christie). “[T]he plaintiff’s collection of quotations is entitled to the protection of law. It 
stands like a trade secret . . . that others might do similar work, if they might, does not 
authorize them to steal the plaintiff’s.” Id. at 250.  
 28 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 10. 
 29 See id. 
 30 Hearing on Futures Trading Before the House Comm. on Agric., 66th 
Cong., 583 (1921). 
 31 Id. at 125. Representative Thaddeus Caraway:  
I have never believed that someone who sits here in the basement of some 
Government building with his hair parted in the middle can run this country 
better than all the people can run their own private business. I have no 
patience with that. I never went to a department in my life I did not come 
away thoroughly angry and half ashamed of my government . . . .  
Id. 
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The problems with bucket shops continued, however, 
giving way to a series of congressional investigations and 
unsuccessful bills that sought to either put heavy regulations 
on futures trading, or prohibit it altogether.32 The industry 
drew on the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trade v. 
Christie to defend against accusations that futures trading was 
similar to gambling, a charge that was grounded in a general 
failure to understand how trading activity could be legitimate 
when the majority of commodities contracts were never 
actually delivered.33 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes validated 
the concept of futures trading in Board of Trade v. Christie.34 
Using the CBOT’s grain pit as an example, he acknowledged 
that in three-fourths of the transactions no grain actually 
exchanged hands.35 Still, Holmes determined that the sales 
were settled legitimately, proclaiming that the fact that 
contracts were satisfied in this way detracts in no way from the 
good faith of the parties and is consistent with a serious 
business purpose.36  
In 1921, Congress approved the Futures Trading Act 
(FTA), the first legislation to create federal oversight of futures 
trading.37 But the FTA was quickly struck down. In Hill v. 
Wallace, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act was an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s taxation authority.38 
The Act had sought to give the Secretary of Agriculture 
authority over exchanges by giving it the power to designate 
exchanges as “contract markets.”39 Options and grain futures 
contracts not traded on government approved exchanges were 
to be subject to a prohibitive 20-cent per bushel tax.40  
  
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Christie, 198 U.S. at 247-48. 
Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of society to 
the probable. Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating 
catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want. It is true 
that the success of the strong induces imitation by the weak, and that 
incompetent persons bring themselves to ruin by undertaking to speculate in 
their turn. But legislatures and courts generally have recognized that the 
natural evolutions of a complex society are to be touched only with a very 
cautious hand, and that such course attempts at a remedy for the waste 
incident . . . are harmful and vain.  
Id. 
 35 Id. at 246-47.  
 36 Id. at 251. 
 37 Futures Trading Act, Aug. 24, 1921 c. 86, 42 Stat. 187.  
 38 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). 
 39 Id. at 63-64 
 40 Id. “To give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all 
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The ruling in Hill helps to illustrate the complex nature 
of the relationship between futures exchanges and the 
government at a time when it was clear that federal 
intervention had become inevitable. While members of the 
futures industry were widely opposed to government oversight, 
representatives of the CBOT itself were not the ones to 
challenge the constitutionality of the FTA. A number of 
members of the CBOT brought the suit, and charged that the 
exchange’s board of directors refused to challenge the statute 
itself because it did not want to offend the Secretary of 
Agriculture.41 In his opinion, Justice William Howard Taft 
concluded that in not challenging the FTA itself the CBOT’s 
board of directors had failed in their duty to represent the 
interests of its members.42  
However, just a few days after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hill there was a manipulation of grain prices, which 
reinforced the belief within Congress that regulation was 
needed immediately.43 Legislatures quickly passed the Grain 
Futures Act of 1922,44 this time resting authority on its 
commerce powers rather than taxation powers. The Supreme 
Court subsequently upheld the Grain Futures Act based on 
Congress’s contention that market volatility on the exchanges 
was a burden on interstate commerce.45 Section 5 of the act 
permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate futures 
trading by requiring that such transactions be conducted on a 
“contract” market that must be licensed by the federal 
government.46 That provision still forms the core of the current 
regulatory system today. It also required that the exchanges 
prevent such conduct as price manipulation,47 marking the 
onset of the exchanges’ role as self-regulator under oversight of 
the federal government.  
  
constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the 
sovereignty of the states.” Id. at 68. 
 41 Id. at 61, 72. “The averments of the bill are that the Board of Directors 
refused the request to bring suit because they feared to antagonize the public officials 
whose duty it was to construe and enforce the act, and not because they thought the act 
was unconstitutional.” Id. at 61 
 42 Id. at 61. In a concurring opinion, Justice Louis Brandeis asserted that the 
Chicago Board of Trade should not be required to contest every statute that its 
members believe to be invalid. Id. at 74. 
 43 Markham, supra note 9, at 338 (citing H.R. REP.NO. 67-1095, at 2 (1922)). 
 44 Commodity Exchange Act (Grain Futures Act), ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (2000)). 
 45 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 56 (1923).  
 46 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).  
 47 Id. at § 5(b). 
 4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM 
2005] IN DEFENSE OF MARKET SELF-REGULATION 1427 
The Grain Futures Administration (GFA), the Secretary 
of Agriculture office that carried out the Act, had the role of 
investigating practices at the exchanges, while actual 
regulation of trading was conducted by the exchanges.48 The 
arrangement had mixed results, with the government in its 
new role often just as responsible for regulation failures as the 
exchanges were. For instance, in an effort to boost surveillance 
the GFA required the clearing members of each exchange to 
provide daily reports that included the market positions of its 
customers.49 But while members of the CBOT were willing to 
make their records available, the GFA had only one internal 
auditor and was therefore unable to monitor the records in a 
meaningful way.50 The GFA suspected fraud and market 
speculation in many of the cases it reviewed, but it had limited 
success in prosecuting the cases. It also began to supervise the 
dissemination of news reports, an effort to stop 
unsubstantiated reports that were moving the market.51  
A series of trading scandals and the onset of the Great 
Depression led to a further loss of faith in the exchanges’ 
ability to regulate themselves.52 On the political front, a 
populist movement against futures trading began to gather 
steam.53 One Senator in favor of heavier government oversight 
called the CBOT the “world’s greatest gambling house.”54  
B.  The Commodities Exchange Act 
In 1936, Congress approved the Commodity Exchange 
Act, the result of efforts by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who had pushed for new regulation of both the securities and 
  
 48 HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 15. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  
In 1927, however, the Grain Futures Administration suspended its 
requirements of daily reports for large traders, because of continuing charges 
that its reports were keeping large bullish speculators from operating in the 
wheat market and thereby depressing prices. It suspended reporting 
requirements from February 26, 1927, until November 1, 1927. It then 
determined that its reports did not have the effect of discouraging bullish 
spectators.  
Id. 
 51 Agricultural Appropriations Bill, Hearings Before a House Subcomm. of the 
Comm. on Appropriations, 69th Cong., 727 (1926).  
 52 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 22-24. 
 53 See id. at 26-27. 
 54 U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., August 
9, 1921, p. 4763 (Sen. Arthur Capper, Republican, Kansas).  
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futures industries.55 Regulation of the two industries was 
separated because the banking committees controlled securities 
matters and the agriculture committees controlled commodity 
exchanges, and neither was willing to cede power.56 The CEA 
was created to replace the Grain Futures Act as the authority 
over day-to-day regulation.57 Drafters of the Act included 
statutes that prohibited market price manipulation,58 created 
“position limits” in a bid to curtail the taking of big speculative 
positions,59 and established registration requirements for 
futures brokers, known as futures commission merchants 
(FCMs).60 The Act also initiated the financial requirement that 
customers place margins in trust with the FCMs.61 
The success of the regulatory effort continued to be 
mixed. The CEA began to regularly audit the FCMs, and found 
that oftentimes their clients’ investments were not being 
properly protected.62 At dozens of firms it was found that the 
positions held by clients did not match the funds that FCMs 
held in segregated accounts (where the accounts of each client 
was segregated from other FCM accounts).63 In one 
investigation the CEA looked at approximately 4500 
discretionary accounts by financial advisors, finding that many 
were not properly executing their clients’ trades on time or 
were leaving unprofitable trades open so that clients would 
have a false impression of the value of their trading portfolios.64  
Even though the members of the futures exchanges had 
resisted passage of the Act, there is evidence they played an 
important role in furthering the government’s regulatory 
efforts once it was passed. For example, in August 1938 the 
heads of the leading commodity exchanges were asked to meet 
in Washington to consider what rules were needed to meet the 
discretionary account problems uncovered by the CEA.65 
Thereafter, every contract market represented at the 
  
 55 See Markham, supra note 9, at 339-40.  
 56 Id. 
 57 Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545. 49 Stat. 1491 [hereinafter 
Commodity Exchange Act]  (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 58 Commodity Exchange Act § 4(c), 6(b). 
 59 Commodity Exchange Act § 4(a).  
 60 Commodity Exchange Act § 4d(1).  
 61 Commodity Exchange Act § 4d(2). 
 62 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 30. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. at 31. 
 65 Id.  
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conference adopted amendments to their rules to prevent such 
practices.66  
In one of the better examples of futures exchanges 
making an earnest effort to police themselves, the CBOT 
pursued one of the country’s biggest and most powerful grain 
traders, Cargill Grain Co., for alleged manipulation of the 
market.67 In 1939 the CBOT required Cargill to liquidate part 
of a large position in 1937 September corn futures, and later 
expelled the company from membership on the exchange.68 
Cargill fought the expulsion with the Commodity Exchange 
Commission, an overseeing body made up of representatives 
from the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Attorney General 
and the Department of Commerce, on the basis that the board 
of trade had acted outside of its authority as defined in the 
Commodity Exchange Act.69 In 1940, the CEA dismissed the 
action, finding that the CBOT had sufficient reason to believe 
that Cargill’s was attempting to manipulate the market.70 
The CBOT’s actions led the Secretary of Agriculture to 
conduct its own probes of Cargill’s trading,71 which would lead 
to a series of charges against Cargill over the next several 
decades. In 1940 the Secretary of Agriculture brought charges 
against Cargill for engaging in “wash trades”72 and 
manipulating the price of corn, and issued a temporary ban on 
its trading privileges.73 Cargill was charged with manipulating 
  
 66 Id.  
 67 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE 
ADMINISTRATION 39 (Sept. 25, 1939). At one time the Cargill Grain Co. held 80% of the 
total long open contracts. Id.  
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE 
ADMINISTRATION 44 (Aug. 31, 1940).  
 71 Id. at 44-45. 
 72 Wash trading, as defined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
is “entering into, or purporting to enter to, transactions to give the appearance that 
purchases and sales have been made, without incurring market risk or changing the 
trader’s market position.” Wash trading involving futures contracts is prohibited by the 
Commodity Exchange Act, available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/glossary/opaglossary_ 
wxyz.htm. Wash trades are pre-arranged simultaneous trades entered into for the 
purpose of artificially inflating volumes or revenues or for the purpose of manipulating 
prices. C. Bryson Hull, Suit Says El Paso Engaged in Wash Trades, REUTERS BUS. 
NEWS, Nov. 21, 2002. 
 73 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE 
ADMINISTRATION 44-45 (Aug. 31, 1940).  
[T]he respondents entered into a stipulation with the complainant, admitting 
that one of the respondents, J.H. MacMillan, Jr., president of Cargill, Inc., 
directed and was responsible for the trading of the Cargill Grain Co. of 
Illinois, which executed transactions in grain futures as alleged in the 
 
 4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM 
1430 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4 
prices of oats futures in 1951 and 1952, and banned from 
trading in oats futures contracts.74 In 1971 a federal appeals 
court upheld a ruling that Cargill had manipulated wheat 
contracts on the CBOT eight years earlier, at one point holding 
62% of the long interest in all contracts to be delivered in May 
of 1963.75 
Still, despite a few notable instances, such as the Cargill 
case, there was evidence that self-regulators were not 
effectively policing exchange floors. The CEA conducted 
infrequent investigations of trading floor practices, and one 
investigation showed that an estimated 10% of the trading 
volume came from wash trades (profitless round trades that 
can be used to inflate trading volume or falsely inflate 
revenues).76 In another instance, regulators conducted a probe 
in 1968 into job lot trading (splitting commodities trades into 
denominations of less than 5,000 bushels) on the CBOT.77 The 
investigation showed a lack of competition in trade execution, 
and as a result customers were paying a higher premium on 
their purchases and were being forced to sell at a greater 
discount. Following the investigation job lot trading on the 
CBOT was discontinued and complaints were issued against 
seven floor traders.78 Such discoveries put pressure on the CEA 
to perform more investigations, despite operating with limited 
resources.79 
Even so, these investigations did not substantiate one of 
the government’s biggest concerns, that floor traders on the 
exchanges exercised their special advantages to profit at the 
expense of the trading public. In 1968 the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) released a study stating that floor traders had 
such advantages.80 In response, the Commodity Exchange 
  
complaint, and that the other individual respondents acted on instructions 
from MacMillan.  
Id. 
 74 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 32. 
 75 Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1971). 
The Government’s theory of this case is that Cargill manipulated the price . . 
. by means of a device known as a “little corner” or “squeeze.” . . . Squeeze 
(congestion): These are terms used to designate a condition in maturing 
futures where sellers (hedgers or speculators), having waited too long to close 
their trades, find there are no new sellers from who they can buy . . . . 
Id.  
 76 HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 51.  
 77 Id.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. 
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Administration (CEA) conducted a test study of potato futures 
contracts traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX). It found that day trading by floor traders 
represented only a small, relatively stable percentage of 
trading, and that short-term intra-day price movements 
resulted principally from trading by the general public, not 
trading by floor traders.81 It also found that two times as often 
as not, floor traders were trading against price movements, 
which indicated to the CEA that day traders actually helped to 
limit volatile price movements.82 
Congress approved amendments to the Commodity 
Exchange Act in 1968 to step up the CEA’s regulatory 
authority.83 The Agriculture Department was a driving force 
behind implementation of the changes, which helps to show an 
animosity that had developed between the government and the 
futures industry.84 The CEA’s power was broadened to include 
the establishment of minimum financial requirements for 
FCMs,85 livestock and concentrated orange juice futures 
contracts were brought under its jurisdiction,86 and criminal 
penalties (from misdemeanor to felony) for market violations 
were made more severe.87 However, one major amendment also 
had an unintended effect of weakening self-regulation. The 
CEA was given the power to disapprove rules implemented at 
the exchanges.88 This government involvement led courts to 
begin to view the exchanges’ rules as carrying a guarantee that 
members of the exchanges would not violate them.89 As a result, 
the amendments had the unintended effect of weakening self-
regulation because exchanges began to reduce their regulatory 
schemes in order to minimize the potential liability from 
private litigation.90 
  
 81 HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 51.  
 82 Id.  
 83 1968 Amendments to CEA, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 30. 
 84 HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 52. 
 85 Commodity Exchange Act Sec. 4d.  
 86 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE COMMODITY 
EXCHANGE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION’S 
REAUTHORIZATION 55 (May 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg990 
74.pdf. 
 87 7 U.S.C. § 9(a) (2000). 
 88 7 U.S.C. § 8a(7) (2000). 
 89 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 62. 
 90 See id.  
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C.  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 
1974 
By the early 1970s there was a growing consensus that 
futures markets were as important to the general public as 
securities markets were.  
A series of market manipulation scandals and a sharp 
increase in trading volumes for both regulated and non-
regulated commodities led to criticism that the CEA was not 
properly protecting small traders and the consuming public.91 
At the time, the country was in the midst of the Cold War, and 
there was concern within Congress that the futures markets 
were susceptible to manipulation by companies from the USSR 
and other foreign nations.92 There was sentiment within 
Congress that regulation within the exchanges was lax, but of 
equal concern was that the CEA was not properly overseeing 
the exchanges.93 An internal report prepared for the inspector 
general of the Department of Agriculture found that the CEA 
relied on the exchanges too heavily to enforce its rules, and 
that self-regulation was insufficient.94 In 1973 a damaging 
article in the Des Moines Register stated that the CEA had 
turned the task of regulation over to the exchanges, and that 
the exchanges were run in a “club like atmosphere.”95  
Congress concluded it needed to establish a regulatory 
authority similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which was created by the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.96 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA) of 
1974 dramatically increased the government’s authority over 
futures exchanges.97 The most important provision of the Act 
  
 91 See id. at 56-57. 
 92 “In the early 1970s, Congress became concerned about the ‘Great Grain 
Robbery,’ that the Soviets were using the commodity futures markets as a means to 
manipulate prices and obtain large profits at the expense of American consumers.” Id. 
at 56. “The ‘Grain Robbery’ of 1972 was one of those economic events that, like the 
OPEC oil embargo . . . can truly be said to have changed the world.” Id. at 262 n.10 
(quoting DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 120-21 (1979)). 
 93 H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 46-47 (1974).  
 94 CEA relied on exchanges to enforce their rules and to insure that all trades 
were executed “competitively. Insufficient effort was made to determine whether 
trading rules were enforced. . . . [W]e also found other suspected violations of trading 
rules which we believe indicate a lack of control, detection and enforcement of rules 
governing the execution of customer orders.” Id. 
 95 Clark Mollenhoff, Probe CEA False Reports—Gross Fraud Alleged, THE 
DES MOINES REG., Oct. 1, 1973.  
 96 Markham, supra note 9, at 341.  
 97 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 
88 Stat. 1389 [hereinafter CFTC Act] (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
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was the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), an independent five-member regulatory 
commission.98 The agency was given exclusive jurisdiction over 
the trading of futures and options on all commodities.99 Just as 
in the securities industry, exchanges would continue to 
regulate themselves, though the CFTC would be overseer with 
broader authority and more resources.100 
But while the debate leading up to the CFTCA focused 
on how to increase the government’s authority, the reality of 
attaining that goal forced legislatures to concentrate on what is 
still a major consideration today: cost and efficiency. The result 
was actually to increase the responsibility of the exchanges, 
though under broader and stricter guidelines so that the 
government could be a more efficient overseer.101 In a hearing 
before the Senate’s Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in 
May of 1974, Senator George McGovern from South Dakota 
argued that registered exchanges should be performing many 
of the routine checks and investigations that the government 
was currently responsible for, while the federal regulatory arm 
should have a heavier hand in making sure the exchanges 
enforce the government’s rules.102 In one example of inefficiency, 
McGovern said that the CEA’s professional staff spent about 
25% of its time performing routine audits of the hundreds of 
FCMs. It made more sense to place the primary responsibility 
for those audits with the exchanges themselves.103 The size of 
the CEA’s staff, he pointed out, remained at 165 between 1970 
and 1973, even though the volume of derivatives contracts 
traded had surged by 73% during the same period.104 By 
McGovern’s estimation, the growth in the market was fast 
outpacing the CEA’s resources. 
  
 98 CFTC Act § 201. 
 99 Id. 
 100 The CFTC was given increased enforcement powers, the regulatory reach 
of the Commodity Exchange Act was expanded to include commodity trading advisors, 
commodity pool operators, and associated persons of futures commission merchants. 
Markham, supra note 9, at 341.  
 101 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agric. and Forestry, 93d Cong. 199-
200 (1974).  
 102 Id.  
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. at 199. In another example, McGovern said the exchanges should be 
responsible for regularly reviewing the need for position limits on specific commodities 
in order to head off attempts to manipulate the market; be given a time limit for 
implementing and enforcing trading rules; and conduct investigations to seek out 
abusive practices. As futures trading escalated, the CEA simply could not handle these 
sorts of responsibilities. Id. 
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Exchange members who had opposed increased 
government authority over rulemaking argued that the 1974 
Act would destroy the exchanges’ free market traits. In the 
same senate committee hearing, Carlos Bradley, President of 
the Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., said that “the effect of 
such a proposal could be to abdicate completely to the 
government the responsibility of the exchanges, the expertise 
of their members, their public responsibility etc. There would 
be no need for exchange governments.”105 Those arguments, 
however, were generally lost in Congress, where there 
remained strong support to increase government oversight. 
Under the CFTCA, the CFTC’s authority was expanded 
from the statutory list of physical commodities to include 
futures contracts on all goods, articles, services and rights and 
interests—thereby defining the term commodity to include 
anything on which a contract is traded (except onions).106 The 
CFTC was given power to grant reparations to any person hurt 
by a violation of the Act,107 and commodity trading advisers, 
commodity pool operators (enterprises who solicited and 
received funds from others in order to trade in commodity 
futures) and associated persons (employees of FCMs who 
solicited or accepted customer orders or supervised such 
persons) were now required to be registered with the agency.108  
Also, the CFTC now had a direct involvement in the 
regulation by the exchanges. Exchanges were required to 
submit proposals for new rules pertaining to futures contracts 
or trading requirements to the CFTC for advance approval.109 
The CFTC was given long desired authority to intervene in the 
trading of contract exchanges when it deemed market 
disturbances to be emergencies.110 It was also given injunctive 
authority, a power that the Department of Agriculture had 
sought for years.111 The CFTCA increased the potential 
  
 105 Id. at 225. 
 106 CFTC Act § 201 (1974). Onion farmers successfully lobbied to have onions 
withheld from futures trading after onion futures disastrously plummeted in 1955. The 
lobbying effort resulted in the so-called Onion Futures Act, passed by Congress in 1958. 
David S. Jacks, Populists v. Theorists: Futures Markets and the Volatility of Prices, at 
14, at http://aghistory.ucdavis.edu/jackspaper04.pdf. Onions are the only commodity to 
be banned from futures trading. Id. The law was upheld as constitutional in 1959. Id. 
Subsequent studies have shown that onion prices have were volatile when futures 
trading was permitted than after the law was passed. Id.  
 107 CFTC Act § 209.  
 108 Id. at § 4k.  
 109 Id. at § 210.  
 110 Id. at § 215. 
 111 Id. at §6c. 
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penalties for market manipulation to $100,000 from $10,000,112 
and provided the framework for the creation of a quasi-public 
regulator that would, similar to the National Association of 
Securities Dealers in the securities market, govern the conduct 
of market participants who are not members of contracts 
markets.113  
The CFTCA encouraged exchanges to enforce its rules 
under the CFTC’s oversight by explicitly authorizing them to 
discipline their members.114 The exchanges were required to 
report any such actions to the CFTC, which could in turn 
affirm, modify them or set the disciplinary actions aside.115 
Two years later, in 1976, the CFTC commenced one of 
its most significant regulatory reforms. The liquidity 
requirements of FCMs were increased in a move designed to 
ensure that their financial position could not deteriorate to the 
point of endangering customer funds.116 The requirement, while 
imposing substantial costs on the system, was designed to 
insure the financial integrity of the system.117 To defray the cost 
of the audits from the government, the CFTC required FCMs to 
be audited by independent financial accountants.118 Other 
provisions were included in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to 
further protect owners of the futures contracts from financial 
failure of a FCM.119 The capital requirements would set in 
motion an important trend of consolidating trading into the 
hands of the most financially sound FCMs, which in turn would 
allow both government and self-regulators to focus on issues 
like trading violations and market manipulation. 
  
 112 CFTC Act § 6B.  
 113 Id. at §17.  
 114 Id. at § 8C. 
 115 Id.  
 116 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 86. For amended 
statute see 7 U.S.C.A. § 6f(b) (2002).  
 117 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 87. The 
certification requirement, coupled with early warning requirements, is also designed to 
ensure that the CFTC is on early notice when a firm is in financial trouble, so steps can 
be undertaken to prevent or limit injury to customers. Id. 
 118 Id. at 86. 
 119 Id. at 87.  
The primary protection for investors in commodity futures contracts is that 
their funds are kept in segregated trust accounts. It often happens, however, 
that a breach of such trust may occur—the broker could convert the funds, 
either to trade for its own account or to meet the margin calls of another 
customer. In such instances, the new Bankruptcy Code provisions provide for 
the equal sharing of all customers in any remaining segregated funds. . . . 
[T]hese customers have a priority over all other creditors in such funds.  
Id. 
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In the ensuing years, regulation of futures exchanges 
was subject to harsh criticisms, but oftentimes it was directed 
at failures of the CFTC rather than at the exchanges. In 
addition to criticism of the CFTC’s handling of a series of 
options scandals in the late 1970s,120 a report prepared for 
Congressman James Whitten of Mississippi by the Surveys and 
Investigations Staff of the House Committee on Appropriations 
showed that the CFTC was in many respects incompetent.121 
The report found that the CFTC employed a disproportionately 
large number of political appointees and that there had been a 
flagrant misuse of funds, ranging from the use of outside 
consultants in order to avoid civil service hiring restrictions, to 
overpayment for parking spaces and driving services for CFTC 
employees.122 Abuses were also found in the awarding of 
government contracts. For example, one former employee in 
the chairman’s office was given two consulting contracts, which 
if aggregated, would have exceeded a threshold amount that 
would have triggered a requirement to open the contract up to 
a competitive bidding process.123  
D.  The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
After six decades of strengthening its oversight, 
government regulators began to contemplate changing tacks in 
the late 1990s. The CFTC had determined that the financial 
underpinnings of the futures industry had been strengthened 
enough that it would now be more efficient to loosen its grip on 
self-regulators.124 Trading volumes had surged and 
technological advances were giving way to growth of electronic 
  
 120 Id. at 94-96. (detailing in particular the attempt by brothers Bunker and 
Herbert Hunt of Dallas, Texas to corner the soybean market in 1977, at times owning 
the right to take delivery of over one-third of the U.S. carryover inventory for old crop 
soybeans covered by the Chicago Board of Trade contracts). 
 121 HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 95th Cong., INVESTIGATIVE STUDY ON 
THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM. (Comm. Print 1978) (by Mr. Whitten for use 
by the Subcomm. on Agric., Rural Development and Related Agencies).  
 122 See id. at 51, 64-66, 72. “While the schism between the former CEA 
employees and the newly hired CFTC group may have contributed to some of the early 
organizational problems of the Commission, the [Subcommittee’s] Investigative Staff 
was advised that of even greater significance was the rivalries between the new senior-
level staff appointees.” Id. at 23. 
 123 Id. at 64. 
 124 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General 
Legislation, Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 107th Cong. 2-3 
(2000) (statement of C. Robert Paul, General Counsel of Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission). 
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exchanges that could operate across borders.125 The industry 
argued that the current regulatory system had bogged it down 
to the point that it may not be able to compete effectively with 
foreign exchanges. Under heavy pressure from the industry,126 
the CFTC approved a series of amendments called the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.127 The aim of 
the CFMA was to make the regulatory framework more 
flexible. Exchanges were now allowed to create a regulatory 
framework from sets of “core principles” that fit their 
particular operation, rather than have to adhere to a one size 
fits all system.128 The framework also created three regulatory 
tiers for markets, with a lower level of regulatory oversight 
where access to the exchange or trading facility is limited to 
commercial participants and the nature of the underlying 
commodities provides a low risk of manipulation.129 
Unlike the fiery debates that preceded prior regulatory 
legislation, there appeared to be little contention between the 
industry and government regarding the CFMA. In a March, 
2000 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Research, 
Nutrition and General Legislation, of the Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Senator Peter Fitzgerald, 
the chairman, opened by saying that “the CFTC has suggested 
that it is willing to grant broad regulatory relief to futures 
exchanges.”130 C. Robert Paul, General Counsel of the CFTC, 
followed by saying that one of the CFTC’s main policy goals 
should be “removing any regulatory barriers that hamper these 
markets from fully exploiting innovations in technology.”131  
The major futures exchanges chimed in. David Brennan, 
chairman of the CBOT, told the subcommittee that it “heartily 
endorses the concept of replacing inflexible, micromanageing 
  
 125 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Farm Commodities and 
Risk of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong. 16 (2003) (statement of James 
Newsome, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in response to 
question by the subcommittee). 
 126 Id. Committee member and Representative from Kansas Jerry Moran said 
in a review of the CFMA two years after it was approved: “[W]e heard continually from 
the exchanges about the potential threat if we didn’t appropriately deregulate the 
industry, the threat from competition, foreign sources, from the ability of customers to 
utilize exchange service offshore.” Id. 
 127 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763 (2000) (amendments in scattered sections throughout 7 U.S.C.). 
 128 7 U.S.C. § 7(d) (2000).  
 129 Id.  
 130 Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General Legis., 
supra note 124, at 1. 
 131 Id. at 2.  
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[sic], government mandates with core principles. The CFTC is 
right that exchanges and others are best able to design systems 
to achieve the desired and shared objectives of market 
integrity, financial integrity and preventing abuses.”132 
At a hearing to discuss the CFMA two and a half years 
after it was approved, congressional members seemed unable to 
assess whether the new system had been an improvement or 
not. The CFTC defended the CFMA by saying trade volume in 
futures has increased by 50% since its passage, and that as it 
had predicted, the industry has become substantially more 
competitive.133  
But in the interim there had also been a series of 
market scandals, including the collapse of a major energy 
trader, Enron Corp., and several congressmen raised concerns 
about whether the CFTC was properly able to monitor the 
energy markets.134 CFTC Chairman James Newsome also 
conceded that foreign exchanges had not followed suit with 
similar moves to liberalize their regulatory regimes.135  
III. DEMUTUALIZATION AND MODERN TRENDS 
A.  Trend of For-Profit Exchanges 
The trend by the world’s largest exchanges to 
demutualize has pushed the debate about self-regulation back 
to the forefront.136 Demutualization in this context refers to the 
conversion of non-profit, membership-owned organizations into 
for-profit stock corporations. Demutualization among futures 
and securities exchanges has been driven by forces in the 
business environment, including advances in technology, 
globalization of markets, a concentration of investment capital, 
competitive pricing pressure and government deregulation.137 
  
 132 Id. at 64. 
 133 Hearing Before House Subcomm. on General Farm Commodities, supra 
note 125, at 16 (statement by James Newsome, Chairman of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission). Newsome said that during the prior one and a half years, the 
CFTC, which usually handles about 100 investigations concurrently, had conducted 
roughly 30 investigations in the energy sector. Id. at 27.  
 134 Id. at 22. 
 135 Id. at 16-17. 
 136 See generally Karmel, supra note 1.  
 137 Id. at 368. 
A dramatic shift in the economic and power structure of the securities 
industry is currently in progress. Although competition to traditional 
markets from electronic trading markets may be the precipitating cause of 
this upheaval, more than technology is driving these changes. The worldwide 
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By demutualizing, management at the exchanges hope to be 
able to raise larger pools of money, which in turn would allow 
them to invest more in technology and grow their businesses. 
Proponents also believe that demutualization will create a 
fairer marketplace. The members who have traditionally run 
the exchanges have been driven by the profits earned from 
their own trading. The demutualized exchanges would in 
theory be directed by shareholders and experienced 
management teams who are more focused on the bottom line,138 
which in a competitive environment would mean there would 
be pressure to provide the best possible services. 
There are concerns that demutualization creates new 
conflicts of interest. One concern is that an inherent conflict 
exists between the interests of the shareholders and the 
market users.139 It has been suggested, for example, that a for-
profit exchange would not rigorously undertake self-regulatory 
obligations if those obligations negatively affect profitability.140 
The issue is whether a commercial entity that is running an 
exchange and seeking to protect and promote its business can 
also support the integrity and efficiency of the trading markets 
by setting and enforcing regulations that are in the public 
interest.141 
One must enter this debate with the understanding that 
the current structure has its own conflicts. Even traditional, 
not for profit exchanges are run by members interested in 
  
rise in stock exchanges trading volume, global integration of the capital 
markets and competition for trading profits have triggered a 
disintermediation comparable to the unfixing of commission rates. 
Decimalization has cut the conventional trading increment, formerly twelve 
and a half cents, to a penny or less. Futures exchanges similarly have been 
buffeted by technological change, global competition and resulting cost 
pressures.  
Id. 
 138 Robert Wilmouth, President of the National Futures Association, Remarks 
at the IOSCO Conference (June 24, 2001), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/ 
news/mewstestimony.asp?articleID=287 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  
 139 See Erickson, supra note 2, at 5.  
 140 Id at 5-6.  
 141 Karmel, supra note 1, at 420. But see Erickson, supra note 2, at 6 n.9: 
[I]n a briefing of staff for the Senate Agriculture Committee, Robert Colby, 
Deputy Director of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, raised the 
converse argument. Would a demutualized exchange have a perverse 
incentive to impose hefty fines for violative activity, thereby creating a profit 
center for the exchange? While this view might be a short-term profit 
maximization strategy, an exchange employing such a practice would quickly 
lose business in a competitive market where similar products are traded on 
many exchanges. 
Id. 
 4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM 
1440 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4 
making money and enhancing value through trading and seat 
value.142 Furthermore, the current structure of exchange 
disciplinary programs, where members sanction fellow 
members, could arguably affect the rigor of an exchange’s self-
regulatory program. Therefore, to some extent, questioning the 
efficacy of a for-profit structure in fulfilling self-regulatory 
obligations is also questioning the current exchange structure.  
According to a CFTC report on demutualization that 
was published by CFTC Commissioner Thomas Erickson in 
2000, even if new conflicts arise under the for-profit context, 
exchanges would continue to have a self-interest in preserving 
their reputations for providing fair and efficient markets.143  
Exchanges like the CME, the New York Stock Exchange 
and the New York Mercantile Exchange aggressively market 
their records of regulatory enforcement to attract new business, 
and as more competitors enter the market place, the 
reputations of these exchanges will pay a heavier price when 
their regulatory systems fail.144 During a Senate hearing in 
2000, Thomas Donovan, the chief executive of the CBOT, told 
legislators that “the CFTC strictly should be an oversight 
agency, one that provides the flexibility for us to use our self—
the regulatory structure as a marketing tool for people to want 
to come and trade . . . .”145 At the same hearing, James McNulty, 
the CEO of the CME, concurred, saying that the exchange has 
built “a highly disciplined self-regulatory body in the CME, and 
we think that is one of the reasons people come to work with 
our exchange.”146 
B.  Initial Reforms: Exchanges and Regulation Bodies React  
One issue that exchanges have been forced to address is 
the independence of boards of directors. A scandal over 
governance at the New York Stock Exchange led regulators to 
revisit issues surrounding exchanges’ governance standards.147 
In September of 2003, NYSE Chairman and CEO Richard 
  
 142 Erickson, supra note 2, at 6. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id.  
 145 Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General Legis., 
supra note 124, at 20.  
 146 Id. In the securities industry, the NYSE has a regulatory staff of 550 
people and a budget of $142 million annually. The NASD has a regulatory staff of 2100 
people and an annual budget of $500 million. See Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2.  
 147 See, e.g., Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2. 
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Grasso was pressured to resign after it was made public that 
he was entitled to close to $140 million in compensation and 
deferred retirement benefits in 2003148 (the NYSE as a whole 
made less than $28.1 million in profits in 2002).149 Much of the 
focus since has centered on the structure of the board, and 
claims that it did not receive enough information to gain a 
sufficient understanding of the pay package it was approving.150 
A review of the NYSE’s approach is relevant to the 
study of futures exchanges because the futures industry has 
historically followed the lead of the securities industry.151 
Grasso, a 35-year veteran at the NYSE, had been a respected 
figure in the debate over demutualization for both securities 
and futures exchanges. In a hearing before the Senate Banking 
Committee in September of 1999, Grasso said that the NYSE 
would need to demutualize, and possibly go public, in order to 
fend off competition from “electronic communications 
networks,” commercially-owned electronic trading systems 
known as ECNs.152 Grasso argued that ECNs are not subject to 
cumbersome self-regulatory requirements, and are often owned 
by wealthy corporations that are willing to invest money to 
expand and enhance their businesses.153 Demutualization would 
cause the members’ interests to align with the success of the 
exchange as a whole, as opposed to being skewed toward the 
success of only the floor trading operations.154 Under a for-profit 
structure the NYSE would also be able to raise money by 
  
 148 Jake Keaveny & Brendan Intindola, NYSE Chairman Grasso Resigns 
Under Pressure, REUTERS NEWS, Sept. 17, 2003. It was later determined that Grasso’s 
total compensation, including compensation and deferred benefits, was closer to $190 
million, when including an additional $50 million he claimed to be owed. Ben White, 
Former NYSE Chairman Grasso Sued Over Pay, Washington Post, May 25, 2004. 
 149 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (2002), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2002ar_financial_review.pdf (last viewed Mar. 27, 2005). 
 150 Andrew Countryman, NYSE Chief Proposes Independent Board, CHI. 
TRIB., Nov. 6, 2003, at 1. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, whose office has 
jurisdiction over not-for-profit corporations like the NYSE, said his office “will probe 
the role of NYSE board members and others that helped create” Grasso’s compensation 
package.” Under New York not-for-profit laws directors can only approve compensation 
packages to executives that are commensurate with the benefits that the executives 
provide to the corporation. Jake Keaveny and Mark McSherry, Spitzer Says Troubled 
by Report on Grasso Pay, REUTERS NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004.  
 151 See Karmel, supra note 1, at 402 (“To a large extent the CFTC is an 
analogue to the SEC . . . .”). 
 152 PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKETS: HEARING BEFORE THE 
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 106th Cong. 3-4 (Sept. 28, 
1999) (statement of Richard A. Grasso, CEO, New York Stock Exchange) [herinafter 
Grasso, Hearing] 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id.  
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selling stock, either publicly or to private investors. Grasso also 
argued that greater competition in the market place would 
strengthen the NYSE’s commitment to regulation.155 At the 
time he made that statement, the exchange had no intentions 
of altering the compensation of its board—then made up of 50% 
industry representatives and 50% public directors unaffiliated 
with its members—as a way to eliminate conflicts.156  
The public outcry surrounding Grasso’s ouster has since 
led the 211-year old exchange to dramatically alter its course. 
John Reed, the former co-CEO of Citigroup Inc. who was 
brought in as interim NYSE chairman, orchestrated a series of 
reforms.157 NYSE members approved a plan that the board be 
cut down to 8 members, less than a third of its present size, 
and not include any representatives of the financial firms that 
are members of the exchange.158 Under the new structure, the 
board is responsible for such issues as compensation, 
independent audits, and self-regulation, while a separate 
advisory committee that would include member firms would be 
created to help oversee issues that are strategic to the 
exchange’s business.159 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission has approved the proposal.160 
Such corporate governance initiatives are implemented 
on securities markets sooner than on futures markets because 
of the public nature of the companies that are listed on them. 
The latest board proposal at the NYSE is an extension to a 
similar shake-up some 31 years earlier. In 1972, significant 
changes were made to the NYSE constitution after release of 
the Martin Report, a congressionally commissioned study that 
  
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 5. 
 157 See Phyllis Plitch, Reed Keeps SRO Status, But Adds Independent Board, 
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 5, 2003.  
 158 See Greg Farrell, Reed Proposes Cutting NYSE Board to Eight, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 6, 2003. Several State treasurers and large public pension officials, some 
of whom publicly pushed for Grasso’s ouster, felt that Reed’s plan was just more of the 
status quo. Sean Harrigan, president of the nation’s largest public pension fund, the 
$145 billion California Public Employee’s Retirement System, said “Investors were 
expecting a home run proposal to reform the New York Stock Exchange. What we got . . 
. is not even a base hit.” Arden Dale, Pension Funds See Flaws in NYSE Reform Plan, 
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 5, 2003. 
 159 See Plitch, supra note 157.  
 160 Ken Hoover, SEC Approves NYSE’s Reform Proposals, But Critics Will 
Press for More Change, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 18, 2003. While SEC 
commissioners unanimously approved the proposals, “[SEC Chairman] William 
Donaldson said further change may come as the SEC undertakes a broad review of 
market self-regulation in 2004.” Id. 
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was critical of the exchange.161 The report had recommended 
that the NYSE reduce the number of board seats to twenty-one 
from thirty-three, and that the number of members 
representing the public be increased to ten from three.162 Prior 
to the reforms half of the NYSE’s board had been composed of 
public directors. 
Traditionally, outside directors representing the public 
had only a token representation on futures exchanges.163 In 
1989, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ran an undercover 
sting at the CME and CBOT that resulted in the indictment of 
forty-eight individuals for various trading practice violations on 
commodity exchange floors.164 The controversy surrounding the 
arrests led Congress to amend the Commodity Futures Act in 
1992, including a provision which had previously failed that 
required at least 20% of the regular voting members of the 
exchanges’ boards be independent, non-member directors.165 
Other provisions required that a diversity of interests be 
represented by including the principal groups of the 
commodities being traded, floor brokers and at least 10% from 
a group that included farmers, merchants, and exporters.166 
  
 161 See Karmel, supra note 1, at 405.  
 162 Id. at 405-06. 
These changes occurred in the context of uncertainty about the immunity of 
stock exchanges form the anti-trust laws, pressures to unfix commission rates 
and the financial and operational back office crisis of the securities industry. 
These developments ultimately led to the enactment of the 1975 Act that 
restructured the regulatory relationship between the SEC and SROs and 
stripped stock exchanges of some of their former autonomy. The Martin 
Report was intended to compel the NYSE to discard what vestiges of a 
private club atmosphere then remained and to become a quasi-public 
organization. 
Id. (citing House Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 
Securities Industry Study, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Spec. Rep. 438, at 3-13, 131-46, 155-
68 (Aug. 25, 1972)). In 1971 the NYSE was incorporated, and initially the SEC had 
some doubts about whether this would hurt its ability to be a self-regulator. See 
Comments on NYSE Incorporation, Exchange Act Rel. No. 9112, 1971 WL 1717 (SEC) 
(Mar. 17, 1971).  
 163 See Joseph Weber, Red Flags Rising at the Merc, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 20, 
2003. 
 164 See Karmel, supra note 1, at 408 (citing JERRY W. MARKHAM, 
COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION AND OTHER CLAIMS § 14.10 (1998)).  
 165 See id.  
These criminal indictments were upheld, although the trials had mixed 
results. In response to the sting operations Congress passed legislation to 
strengthen trading in the pits . . . audit trails were strengthened, there was 
increased regulation of floor broker associations, and more outsiders were 
required to be included on exchange boards and disciplinary committees.  
Id. at 408-09 (citing MARKHAM, supra note 164, at § 14.10).  
 166 Karmel, supra note 1, at 409. 
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A major futures exchange to come under scrutiny 
following the NYSE scandal was the CME.167 In 2000 the CME 
was the first exchange to demutualize168 (preceding plans by the 
CBOT and the New York Mercantile Exchange),169 and in 2002 
it became the only major U.S. exchange to go public.170 In an 
October, 2003 article, Business Week reporter Joseph Weber 
questioned the independence of the CME’s board, and said that 
the CFTC is scrutinizing its corporate governance policies.171 At 
the time only four of the 105-year old exchange’s twenty 
directors do not have ties to the CME or its trading floor, while 
fifteen were long time exchange members.172  
In November, 2003 the CME announced that it planned 
to make a number of changes to its Board that would enhance 
the independent oversight of key corporate governance issues.173 
As part of the plan, the CME would create a new board level 
committee in 2004, comprised solely of independent, non-
member directors.174 The committee would conduct an annual 
review of issues that include the independence of the CME’s 
regulatory functions from its business operations; the CME’s 
compliance with its statutory self-regulatory responsibilities; 
the funding of the CME’s self-regulatory responsibilities; and 
  
 167 Weber, supra note 163. 
 168 Chicago Mercantile Exchange to Dual List on Nasdaq Stock Market, 
NASDAQ PRESS RELEASE, April 27, 2005, at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/ 
pr2005/ne_section05_047.stm. See Erickson, supra note 2, at 4. At the time that the 
CME demutualized is set in motion a two year plan to reduce its existing 39-member 
board to 19 members, with the exchange run by a chief executive officer hired by the 
board. Id.  
 169 Peter McKay, SEC Clears CBOT Reorganization, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 
2005, at C4. 
 170 Chicago Merc Nets About $117.8 Million in IPO, REUTERS NEWS, Dec. 12, 
2002. 
 171 Weber, supra note 163 (“The Merc board—including its compensation 
committee—remains controlled by traders and floor brokers who are regulated by the 
exchange. Indeed, the Merc [CME] seems rife with the same conflicts of interest that 
tarnished the Big Board [NYSE] before CEO Richard A. Grasso self destructed.”). 
 172 Id.   
 173 Peter A. McKay, CME Alters Governance in Step That May Help Avert 
Criticism, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at C16.  
Market-structure experts were quick to say the changes . . . are mild 
compared with the plan put out by Big Board [NYSE] interim Chairman John 
Reed. . . . Still, the plan will have some immediate results . . . trader William 
R. Shepard, longtime chairman of the Merc’s compensation committee, will 
leave that position. Also, the plan, which came out of the governance 
committee now led by trader Jack Sandner, will require him to give up that 
position.  
Id.  
 174 Id. 
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the compensation of exchange employees involved in regulatory 
activities.175  
By making its boards more independent, the NYSE and 
the CME hope to preserve its regulatory roles from 
encroachment by the government. Critics have suggested that 
self-regulatory bodies should be completely separate from the 
exchanges’ business operations.176 The NYSE has publicly 
opposed suggestions that it should either spin its regulatory 
unit off into a subsidiary, or that the industry should move 
towards a single self-regulatory organization (SRO) for the 
entire securities industry, such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, a NYSE competitor.177 In the futures 
industry, the National Futures Association (NFA) has 
aggressively marketed itself as a third party provider of 
regulatory services to other exchanges, though with limited 
success.178  
Regulatory authorities have been a step slower, but are 
moving ahead with comprehensive groups of proposals. The 
SEC, which saw nearly all of the major scandals of the last 
several years come under its watch, has opened a series of 
governance and regulatory related proposals for public 
comment.179 Some of the proposals mimic those made by 
securities industry. The SEC would call for securities 
exchanges and registered securities associations to require a 
majority of board members to be independent, and certain 
board committees would be required to be composed solely of 
independent directors.180 There would also be requirements that 
a separation be maintained between regulatory functions and 
  
 175 Id.  
 176 See Karmel, supra note 1, at 424-26. 
 177 Grasso, Hearing, supra at note 152, at 3-4. “John Reed, the interim NYSE 
chairman brought in after the Grasso uproar, is seeking to preserve self-regulation.” 
Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2.  
 178 See Hearing Before Senate Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General 
Legislation, supra note 124, 11 (statement of Robert Wilmouth, Chief Executive, NFA).  
From 1977 to 1999 there were no new futures exchanges formed. In the last 
six months, at least six different enterprises have stated their interest in 
creating new electronic futures exchanges. All of them are dedicated to using 
effective self-regulation . . . but none . . . are really shackled by the past. 
Everyone is looking for more efficient ways to perform their self-regulatory 
functions, and everyone has contracted NFA to discuss outsourcing that 
function to us.  
Id. at 12. 
 179 Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 70 
Fed. Reg. 11 (Proposed Jan. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. at pt. 240, 242, and 
249) [hereinafter Fair Administration and Governance]. 
 180 Id.  
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market operations, and that funds brought in from regulatory 
fines, fees and penalties be used for regulatory purposes.181 
Further, the proposals would prohibit members that are 
brokers or dealers from owning or voting more than 20% of the 
ownership interest in the exchange.182 Among other proposals, 
the SEC would require exchanges to maintain their books and 
records in the U.S. and add reporting requirements by the 
exchanges to enhance transparency.183 Exchanges that go 
public, and whose shares trade on their own exchange, would 
have a separate group of requirements to help supervise 
trading and enforce listing standards.184 
For its part, CFTC Chairman James Newsome opened a 
review of self-regulation in May of 2003.185 The review revolves 
around an analysis of regulation under the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act.186 As of April, 2003, it had opened a formal 
request for commentary from futures market participants that 
includes: board composition, regulatory structure, forms of 
ownership of the exchanges, the structure of disciplinary 
committees, and other issues.187  
C.  Potential Alternatives: the NFA model and Market 
Competition 
The nature of the SRO structure makes the potential for 
conflicts almost inherent. Under the 1934 Commodities 
Exchange Act, SROs are required to act as quasi-governmental 
bodies in implementing federal laws as their own. Yet SROs 
are also membership organizations that represent the economic 
interests of their partners.188 In addition, SROs are 
marketplaces concerned with preserving and enhancing their 
competitive positions.189 As competition grows among 
marketplaces and SROs, it seems that the relationship that 
SROs have with their members inevitably will strain the SROs’ 
ability to carry out their regulatory duties impartially.190  
  
 181 Id. 
 182 Id.  
 183 Id.  
 184 Fair Administration and Governance, supra note 179. 
 185 Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Governance of Self-Regulatory 
Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. 111 (request for comments made June 9, 2004). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
 189 See id. at 9.  
 190 See id. 
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In a recently updated study, the Securities Industry 
Association (SIA), an industry group, evaluated six potential 
models for self-regulation.191 In evaluating the models the SIA 
echoed the original argument that the SRO model puts 
regulatory decisions in the hands of people familiar with the 
relevant facts, and that any regulatory change should not 
abandon the system in favor of a distant, generalist regulator 
that is not as deeply familiar with the markets it regulates.192 
The study outlined a series of possible alternative structures 
that include the splitting off of SRO functions into subsidiaries 
of the exchanges; creation of a single SRO to audit and monitor 
all broker dealers; or putting all of the regulatory responsibility 
into the hands of the SEC (or CFTC).193  
Proponents of a single SRO system argue that the 
transition could be made relatively easily in the futures 
industry because the NFA has already been sanctioned by, and 
works closely with, the CFTC.194 The NFA, which is similar to 
the National Association of Securities Dealers in the securities 
industry, began as a regulator for trading participants that 
were not registered with exchanges, but has moved into the 
business of outsourcing its regulation services. The NFA can 
avoid some of the criticisms arising from the demutualization 
of SROs because it is a non-profit organization.195 Its board is 
made up of representatives from the industry, though it is not 
controlled by any one entity.196  
The economic inefficiencies that come with operating 
multiple SROs could also help to promote a single SRO system. 
The NFA has marketed itself as an outsourcing facility for self-
regulatory functions.197 By regulating numerous exchanges, the 
NRA (or another comparable outsourcer to enter the market) 
  
 191 See generally id. 
 192 Id. at 6. 
 193 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 2-12. 
 194 Id.  
 195 See Natasha de Teran, Eurex Signs Up National Futures Association for 
US Exchange, FIN. NEWS, Nov. 6, 2003. Rudolf Ferscha, Eurex CEO, said of an 
agreement to farm out is regulatory services to NFA: “We have agreed on initial plans 
of a three-year contract, with automatic one-year renewal contracts thereafter. The 
NFA will ensure that Eurex US’s customers are protected at all times, and that 
business will be fair, orderly and transparent.” Id. 
 196 See Board of Directors at the National Futures Association website, at 
http://www.nfa.futures.org/aboutnfa/board.asp. 
 197 See Hearing Before Senate Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition and General 
Legislature, supra note 124, at 11 (statement of Robert Wilmouth, Chief Executive, 
NFA).  
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would benefit from efficiencies of scale.198 Several newer 
exchanges have contracted the NFA in hopes of finding a cost 
effective means to regulate their trading operations. If pressure 
on expenditures continues then traditional exchanges like the 
CBOT and the CME could be pressured to reduce regulatory 
expenditures,199 which in turn could diminish the quality of 
regulation. Traditional exchanges are already being squeezed 
by the trend towards lower trading fees. However, the NFA’s 
outsourcing model is not free of potential conflicts either. As 
the practice becomes more prevalent, issues could be raised 
regarding the exchange’s continuing responsibility over its 
contractor and the relationship of both entities to the 
overseeing government regulator.200 
The NFA entered into an agreement with Merchants 
Exchange and BrokerTech, two small U.S. futures exchanges, 
to perform market surveillance, conduct background checks, 
investigate and litigate disciplinary matters, and perform 
audits and financial surveillance.201 This led to a break through 
deal that could give the NFA new credibility as a third party 
regulator. In November of 2003, it signed a three-year contract 
with Eurex US, the U.S. arm of Eurex, to be its regulator.202 
Frankfurt-based Eurex, which in recent years surpassed the 
CBOT as the world’s largest futures exchange in terms of 
volume traded, received approval form the CFTC to set up a 
U.S. exchange in 2004.203  
Detractors of the single SRO model say that it would 
weaken self-regulation. Broker-dealer regulation has its roots 
in efforts to assure creditworthiness of exchange members.204 In 
that regard, the big exchanges have spent hundreds of millions 
of dollars setting up self-regulatory systems to stand behind 
assurances that large member firms are financially viable.205 A 
  
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 See Int’l Org. of Sec. Communications Technical Comm., Discussion Paper 
on Stock Exchange Demutualization, at 8 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.iosco. 
org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD112.pdf. 
 201 Ros Krasny, Eurex US in Deal With Regulatory Services Provider, REUTERS 
NEWS, Nov. 5, 2003.  
 202 Jeremy Grant, Eurex US Unveils Governance Structure, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 
6, 2003. 
 203 Eurex US Launch Date Moved to Feb 8 Pending CFTC Approval, MARKET 
NEWS INT’L, Jan. 28, 2004. 
 204 See HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 1, at 86.  
 205 See Cohen & Kelly, supra note 2. In the securities industry, the NYSE has 
a regulatory staff of 550 people and a budget of $142 million annually. The NASD has a 
regulatory staff of 2,100 people and an annual budget of $500 million.  
 4/9/2005 6:07:50 PM 
2005] IN DEFENSE OF MARKET SELF-REGULATION 1449 
single SRO based in a separate location from the exchange and 
indirectly run by the CFTC or SEC may never be able to attain 
the same level of intimacy with a particular exchange. Not 
surprisingly, major exchanges like the NYSE, the CME and the 
CBOT have sought to preserve their regulatory duties by 
publicly opposing a single SRO model.206  
Ultimately, competition in the market place may dictate 
the future model. If choice and competition are important in 
how financial products are offered, perhaps there are analogous 
benefits in terms of how exchanges are self-regulated.207 Just as 
the NFA has offered its services as third party regulator, the 
CME or CBOT also may decide to compete by also farming out 
their regulatory services.208 Thomas Erickson, the former CFTC 
commissioner, indicated there is talk that the CME has studied 
such an initiative. The NASD has taken similar initiatives in 
the securities business, and could also work toward offering a 
similar service to futures exchanges, according to Erickson.209 
Such a scenario opens up the specter of further conflicts. For 
instance, the CME could create a structure where it acted as 
regulator to itself and a competitor. A third party SRO could be 
acquired by a large financial firm like Citigroup Inc. or J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co., which also operate FCMs. Will the 
quality of self-regulation diminish amid the pressure to cut 
costs?210  
Competitive forces among futures exchanges may also 
give way to new incentives to uphold regulatory standards.211 
  
 206 See House Subcomm. Hearing on General Farm Commodities and Risk 
Management, supra note 125, at 61. (statement of Terrence A. Duffy, Chairman 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (“Rather than detracting from our ability as a self 
regulator, the CME’s incentives and capability to maintain an effective program of self-
regulation have been enhanced by its reorganization as a for-profit company.”).  
 207 See Erickson, supra note 2, at 8. Moreover, to require exchanges to contract 
with a super self-regulator would appear to be inconsistent with the CFTC’s role as an 
oversight agency, especially if regulatory concerns do not outweigh the benefits of the 
current SRO structure. Id. 
 208 Telephone interview with Thomas Erickson, former CFTC Commissioner 
and Vice-President, Bunge Ltd., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2003).  
 209 Id. The NASD has been pushing for a single SRO model and the former 
Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, briefly embraced this model. See Jeffrey E. 
Garten, Manager’s Journal: How to Keep NYSE’s Stock High, WALL ST. J. Sept. 13, 
1999, at A44. The main barrier has been that the NYSE opposes the single SRO model. 
Grasso, Hearing, supra note 152.  
 210 Telephone interview with Thomas Erickson, former CFTC Commissioner 
and Vice-President, Bunge Ltd., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2003).  
 211 Karmel, supra note 1, at 370.  
An interesting and relevant question is whether current trading technologies 
and the competition these technologies have engendered should lead to a 
reduction of SEC market regulation, rather than increase in regulation 
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Currently, exchanges like the CBOT and CME say that the 
integrity of their market place is the biggest incentive to 
uphold such standards. But that argument has weaknesses 
because for many futures products those exchanges offer the 
only liquid markets for particular contracts, and thus they 
enjoy de facto monopolies.212 If, for instance, the Eurex’s U.S. 
exchange gains market share, and also offers a more 
transparent, and fair trading operation, then regulation issues 
could become more prevalent in traders’ decisions over where 
they do business. In at least one instance, competitive 
pressures have already had an impact. In 2003 the SEC issued 
a report that said the American Stock Exchange had massive 
shortcomings in its regulation of options trading and that it 
had attempted to cover up its deficiencies.213 In October of 2003 
board members from the NASD, which holds a majority stake 
in the American Stock Exchange, and the American Stock 
Exchange voted to have the NASD take over its self-
regulation.214 In making the decision, the directors at both 
boards considered the American Stock Exchange’s poor 
performance in the regulatory arena and the high cost of 
regulation.215  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Critics have questioned the SROs’ ability to maintain 
fair and transparent trading, but as this Note has 
demonstrated, failures in government oversight have also been 
pervasive. It seems unlikely that the government could operate 
more efficiently as a sole regulator.216 If pure government 
  
envisioned by current SEC concept and rulemaking releases, so that 
competition rather than regulation can determine outcomes.  
Id. at 369-70. 
 212 Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The 
Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 154 (1995) (“As the advocates of 
self-regulation suggest, competition from other exchanges could mitigate, and perhaps 
eliminate, these problems. Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that competition 
between exchanges in a particular contract is especially acute.”). 
 213 Jed Horowitz et al., SEC Says Amex Had ‘Serious Failure’ in Enforcing 
Regulations, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 29, 2003.  
 214 Jenny Anderson, NASD May Take Over Regulation of Exchange, N.Y. 
POST, Oct. 21, 2003, at 31. 
 215 Id.  
 216 Markham, supra note 9, at 405.  
[W]e must be careful of what we wish for in life. A single regulator may also 
seek to expand its powers after a scandal. A single regulator will also 
undoubtedly use bad judgment in times of crisis. A single regulator could also 
stifle competition, over-regulate, and cause a loss of competitive position in 
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regulation were a preferable alternative, the system of self-
regulation would have been scrapped years ago amid the 
government’s many trials and errors.217 The SRO system is 
preferable to a pure government regulatory scheme because it 
defrays much of the costs onto the market users, and makes 
efficient use of the expertise at the exchanges.  
 The role and duties of SROs vis a vis government regulation 
has steadily evolved since adoption of the Commodity 
Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act, with the 
government approving legislation throughout the years to 
increase its oversight authority and impose stricter standards. 
While the government initially sought to micro-manage 
regulation at the exchanges, it more recently determined that 
giving SROs more autonomy is more effective.  
 Thomas Erickson, who spoke regularly about the future 
of SROs during his tenure as a CFTC Commissioner, said in an 
interview that from a political standpoint the SRO system has 
too much history to ever be scrapped altogether.218 There will be 
conflicts of interest in any system, and so the challenge is to 
create a system with the right oversight and incentives so that 
as many conflicts as possible are eliminated.219 In that regard, 
self-regulation is a preferable system to pure government 
regulation, and the question becomes one of balance. 
The CFTC should take several steps to eliminate the 
specter of conflicts of interest within exchanges. It should 
implement a model for independent boards similar to that 
adopted by the NYSE, or the rules that the SEC has proposed. 
These rules would ensure that exchange members are 
separated from regulation related decisions. Secondly, the 
CFTC should facilitate competition in the marketplace to the 
extent possible. For example, the Eurex’s entrance into the 
U.S. could spark the beginning of a period of a competition 
driven regulation market, where market participants 
themselves go far in determining what the most effective SROs, 
  
international markets. It could even try to become a Japanese MoF [Ministry 
of Finance] that seeks to manage the economy by bureaucratic fiat.  
Id. 
 217 Karmel, supra note 1, at 401. The 1975 Act sought to preserve and 
reinforce the concept of industry self-regulation. Id.  
 218 Telephone interview with Thomas Erickson, former CFTC Commissioner 
and Vice-President, Bunge Ltd., Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2003). Self-regulation is so 
enshrined in U.S. securities regulation that it is unlikely and probably not in the public 
interest for it to be supplanted by government regulation. Karmel, supra note 1, at 427. 
 219 Id. 
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or self-regulatory model, will be. Finally, the CFTC needs to 
establish a formal structure that facilitates regular dialogue 
with exchanges and other market participants. The resulting 
effects of demutualization, electronic trading, and the 
globalization of marketplaces have yet to be fully realized. In 
this way, the CFTC would be able to react in a steady and 
effective manner to conflicts or other issues that arise from 
demutualization and other forces in the marketplace.  
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